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ABSTRACT 
Abstract:  Electronic voting or e-voting has been used in varying forms since 1970s with fundamental 
benefits over paper based systems such as increased efficiency and reduced errors. However, there 
remain challenges to achieve wide spread adoption of such systems especially with respect to improving 
their resilience against potential faults. Blockchain is a disruptive technology of current era and promises 
to improve the overall resilience of e-voting systems. This paper presents an effort to leverage benefits of 
blockchain such as cryptographic foundations and transparency to achieve an effective scheme for e-
voting. The proposed scheme conforms to the fundamental requirements for e-voting schemes and 
achieves end-to-end verifiability. The paper presents details of the proposed e-voting scheme along with 
its implementation using Multichain platform. The paper presents in-depth evaluation of the scheme 
which successfully demonstrates its effectiveness to achieve an end-to-end verifiable e-voting scheme. 
Keywords: electronic voting, e-voting, blockchain, e-government, verifiable voting 
INTRODUCTION  
Elections are fundamental pillar of a democratic system enabling the general public to express their views 
in the form of a vote. Due to their significance to our society, the election process should be transparent 
and reliable so as to ensure participants of its credibility. Within this context, the approach to voting has 
been an ever evolving domain. This evolution is primarily driven by the efforts to make the system 
secure, verifiable and transparent. In view of its significance, continuous efforts have been made to 
improve overall efficiency and resilience of the voting system. Electronic voting or e-voting has a 
profound role in this. Since its first use as punched-card ballots in 1960’s, e-voting systems have achieved 
remarkable progress with its adaption using the internet technologies (Gobel et al, 2015). However, e-
voting systems must adhere to specific benchmark parameters so as to facilitate its widespread adoption. 
These parameters include anonymity of the voter, integrity of the vote and non-repudiation among others.  
Blockchain is one of the emerging technologies with strong cryptographic foundations enabling 
applications to leverage these abilities to achieve resilient security solutions. A Blockchain resembles a 
data structure which maintains and shares all the transactions being executed through its genesis. It is 
primarily a distributed decentralized database that maintains a complete list of constantly germinating and 
growing data records secured from unauthorized manipulating, tampering and revision. Blockchain 
allows every user to connect to the network, send new transactions to it, verify transactions and create 
new blocks (Rosenfeld, 2017; Kadam et al, 2015; Nakamoto, 2009). Each block is assigned a 
cryptographic hash (which may also be treated as a finger print of the block) that remains valid as long as 
the data in the block is not altered. If any changes are made in the block, the cryptographic hash would 
change immediately indicating the change in the data which may be due to a malicious activity. 
Therefore, due to its strong foundations in cryptography, blockchain has been increasingly used to 
mitigate against unauthorized transactions across various domains (Nakamoto, 2009; Kraft, 2015; 
Narayanan et al, 2015). 
Bitcoin remains the most distinguished application of blockchain however researchers are keen to explore 
the use of blockchain technology to facilitate applications across different domains leveraging benefits 
such as non-repudiation, integrity and anonymity. In this paper, we explore the use of blockchain to 
facilitate e-voting applications with the ability to assure voter anonymity, vote integrity and end-to-
verification. We believe e-voting can leverage from fundamental blockchain features such as self-
cryptographic validation structure among transactions (through hashes) and public availability of 
distributed ledger of records. The blockchain technology can play key role in the domain of electronic 
voting due to inherent nature of preserving anonymity, maintaining decentralized and publicly distributed 
ledger of transactions across all the nodes. This makes blockchain technology very efficient to deal with 
the threat of utilizing a voting token more than once and the attempt to influence the transparency of the 
result.  
The focus of our research is to investigate the key issues such as voter anonymity, vote confidentiality and 
end-to-end verification. These challenges form the foundation of an efficient voting system preserving the 
integrity of the voting process. In this paper, we present our efforts to explore the use of the blockchain 
technology to seek solutions to these challenges. In particular, our system is based on the Prêt à Voter 
approach (Ryan, 2008) and uses an open source blockchain platform, Multichain (Multichain, 2017) as 
the underlying technology to develop our system. In order to protect the anonymity and integrity of a 
vote, the system generates strong cryptographic hash for each vote transaction based on information 
specific to a voter.  This hash is also communicated to the voter using encrypted channels to facilitate 
verification. The system therefore conforms with the fundamental requirements of an e-voting system as 
identified by (Rura et al, 2016). More discussion around this is presented in section 2. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the requirements for an e-voting 
system as identified by (Rura et al, 2016) and explains how our proposed system fulfils them. Section 3 
presents the state-of-the-art with respect to e-voting and how we contribute to it followed by a detailed 
description of the system design in section 4. Section 5 presents the implementation of our proposed 
system with Multichain and user interface along with evaluation of the system highlighting how it 
achieves the requirements presented in section 2. Section 6 concludes the paper identifying current 
progress and plans for further work. 
 
 
E-VOTING BACKGROUND AND REQUIREMENTS 
Electronic voting has been an area of research focus for many years by using computing machines and 
equipment for casting votes and producing high quality and precise results in accordance with the 
sentiments of the participating voters. Various attempts have been adopted in practice to support election 
process. Initially computer counting system allowed the voter to cast vote on papers. Later on, those cards 
went through the process of scanning and tallying at every polling cell on a central server (Kadam et al, 
2015; Rockwell, 2017; Hao et al, 2010). Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems were put in 
place later on which were admired and acknowledged greatly by the voters in-spite of the resistance from 
computer scientists. If the voting system is well understood by the voters, the system’s usability can be 
increased remarkably.  DRE systems in particular have gathered a lot of successes in bringing the voters 
to use this technology. These systems work more or less in the same way as any conventional election 
system does. In the case of DRE, a voter begins his journey by going to their polling place and get their 
token to vote where he utilizes his token at the voting terminal to vote for his candidate. When the 
candidate selection procedure is completed, DRE systems present the final selection to the voter before 
actually casting it (in case if the voter wants to change his opinion) and after the final selection, the ballot 
casting is completed (Multichain, 2017; Dalia et al, 2012). 
More recently, distributed ledger technologies such as blockchain have been used to achieve e-voting 
systems primarily due to their advantages in terms of end-to-end verifiability. With properties such as 
anonymity, privacy protection and non-repudiation, blockchain is a very attractive alternative to 
contemporary e-voting systems. The research presented in this paper also attempts to leverage these 
properties of blockchain to achieve an efficient e-voting system. A detailed analysis of such systems is 
presented in the next section along with the identification of comparison with these approaches. 
e-Voting Requirements and Compliance by the Proposed System 
The generic requirements for a typical e-voting system have been defined in (Rura et al, 2016). We 
present a brief description of each requirement along with an explanation of how the proposed system 
fulfils it. 
Privacy - Keeping an individual’s vote secret 
The system leverages cryptographic properties of blockchain to achieve privacy of a voter. More 
specifically, as voter is registered into the system, a voter hash is generated by blockchain which is the 
unique identifier of a voter into the blockchain, and is protected from misuse due to collision resistance 
property of the cryptographic hash. Due to this, the traceability of a vote is also non-trivial thereby 
protecting the voter when under duress.  
Eligibility - Allowing only registered voters to vote, with each such voter voting only once 
All eligible users are required to register using unique identifiers such as government-issued documents to 
assert their eligibility. In addition to this, our system implements strong authentication mechanism using 
finger printing technology to assert that only authorized voters can access the system. Furthermore, the 
use of biometrics also enables the system to protect against double voting. 
Receipt Freeness - Voters should be unable to prove to a third party that they voted in a 
particular way 
The proposed system enables a voter to vote as per their choice and creates a cryptographic hash for each 
such event (transaction). This is important to achieve verifiability i.e. to verify if a certain vote was 
included in the count. However, possession of this hash does not allow to extract information about the 
way voter has voted.  
Convenience - Voters must be able to vote easily, and everyone who is eligible must be 
able to vote  
The system has been implemented using a user friendly web based interface with the voting process 
requiring minimal input from the user. For instance, fingerprinting is implemented for authentication 
mechanism to avoid the requirement to remember username/passwords. Furthermore, the overall process 
is integrated which enables the user to interact with it in a seamless manner. 
Verifiability - The ability to trust the vote tallying process 
Upon casting their vote successfully, a user is provided with their unique transaction ID in the form of a 
cryptographic hash. A user can use this transaction ID to track if their vote was included in the tallying 
process. However, this process does not enable a user to view how they voted which has been adopted to 
mitigate threats when under duress.  
The analysis presented above highlights the performance of the proposed system with respect to the 
specific requirements of e-voting. It also highlights the significance of defining characteristics of 
blockchain and their profound role in achieving the cornerstones of an efficient e-voting system. 
Therefore, we believe the work presented here makes significant contribution to the existing knowledge 
with respect to the application of blockchain technology to achieve a secure digital voting system. 
RELATED WORKS 
In  (Kiayias & Yung, 2002), a self-tallying voting system is proposed that does not require any trusted 
third parties for vote aggregation and any private channel for voter-to-voter privacy. The proposed 
protocol involves extensive computation. In (Hao et al, 2010) a two round protocol is proposed that 
computes the tally in two rounds without using a private channel or a trusted third party. The protocol is 
efficient in terms of amputation and bandwidth consumption but is neither robust nor fair in certain 
conditions (Dalia et al, 2012). In  (Dalia et al, 2012) a protocol is proposed to improve the robustness and 
fairness of the two round protocol (Hao et al, 2010). In (Shahandashti & Hao, 2016), authors propose E2E 
verifiable voting system named DRE-ip (DRE-i with enhanced privacy), that overcomes limitations of 
DRE-i (Chaum et al, 2008). Instead of pre-computing ciphertexts, DRE-ip encrypts the vote on the fly 
during voting process. DRE-ip achieves E2E verifiability without TAs, but at the same time provides a 
significantly stronger privacy guarantee than DRE-i. In (Chaum, 2004) end-to-end verifiability is 
achieved through the Mixnet protocol (Chaum, 1981) that recovers the plaintext ballot in an unlikable 
manner by randomizing the ciphertext through a chain of mix servers.  
Scantegrity is proposed in (Chaum et al, 2008) that achieves end-to-end (E2E) verifiability with 
confirmation codes that allow voters to prove to themselves that their ballots are included in the final tally 
as they really are. Another scheme Prêt à Voter based on (Chaum, 2004) is proposed in (Chaum et al, 
2005) that ensures privacy by constructing the ballot with two columns i.e. voting options are listed in one 
column and the voter's choice is entered in an adjacent column. The work in (Adida & Rivest, 2006) is 
based on Prêt à Voter but using homomorphic tabulation and it uses scratch stripes to allow off-line 
auditing of ballots. Other systems that have been proposed for electronic voting include: Bingo Voting 
(Bohli et al, 2007), Helios (Adida, 2008), DRE-i  (Hao et al, 2014 ) and DRE-ip (Shahandashti & Hao, 
2016), Star-Vote (Bell et al, 2013) and (Sandler et al, 2008) to name a few.  
 
Fig. 1  Architecture for proposed e-voting system. 
 
The existing approaches perform well for end-to-end verifiability without compromising the privacy of 
voters. In (McCorry et al, 2017), authors presented the implementation of decentralized and self-tallying 
internet voting protocol over the blockchain using Ethereum. Authors used the openvote (Chaum et al, 
2008) e-voting approach as their baseline. 
The focus of our research is to explore the exciting opportunities presented by blockchain technologies by 
investigating their application in diverse application domains. Within this context, this paper presents our 
efforts to develop an e-voting system by leveraging blockchain technology. To this end, our proposed 
scheme fulfils the specific requirements for e-voting as discussed in section 2 and illustrated further in the 
following sections.  
 
PROPOSED SYSTEM DEISGN  
The proposed e-voting system is based on the well-established Prêt à Voter e-voting approach identified 
in (Ryan, 2008). The system has been designed to support a voting application in the real world 
environment taking into account specific requirements such as privacy, eligibility, convenience, receipt-
freeness and verifiability. The proposed system aims to achieve secure digital voting without 
compromising its usability. Within this context, the system is designed using a web-based interface to 
facilitate user engagement with measures such as finger printing to protect against double voting. With a 
clear need to administer the voters, constituencies and candidates for constituencies, a user-friendly 
administrator interface is implemented to enable ease of access. Furthermore, the system allows all voters 
equal rights of participation and develops a fair and healthy competition among all the candidates while 
keeping the anonymity of the voters preserved. The cryptographic hash of the transaction (ID) is emailed 
to the voter as a proof that the vote has been casted which may later on be tracked outside the premises of 
the constituency. 
Detailed Description of the Layered Approach 
The proposed e-voting system architecture is presented in Fig. 1 and has been divided into several layers 
to achieve modular design. These layers are described below; 
User Interaction and Front-end Security layer is responsible for interacting with a voter (to support vote 
casting functions) and the administrator (to support functions pertaining to administering the election 
process). It encapsulates two key functions i.e. authentication and authorization of the users (voters and 
administrators) to ensure that the access to the system is restricted to legitimate users in accordance with 
the predefined access control policies.  A number of different methods can be applied to achieve this 
function ranging from basic username/password to more advanced such as fingerprinting or iris 
recognition. Therefore these are rendered specific to individual implementation of the proposed 
architecture. Overall, this layer serves as the first point of contact with the users and is responsible for 
validating user credentials as governed by the system-specific policies. 
Access Control Management layer is envisaged to facilitate layer 1 and layer 3 by providing services 
required for these layers to achieve their expected functions. These services include roles definition, their 
respective access control policies and voting transaction definitions. The role definition and management 
provides core support for the access control functions implemented by layer 1 whereas the voting 
transaction definitions support the blockchain based transaction mapping and mining performed at the 
layer 3. Overall, this layer enables a coherent function of the proposed system by providing the 
foundations required by individual layers. 
e-Voting Transaction Management layer is the core layer of the architecture where the transaction for e-
voting constructed at Role Management / Transactions layer is mapped onto the blockchain transaction to 
be mined. This mapped transaction also contains the credentials provided by a voter at layer 1 for 
authentication. An example of such data can be the fingerprint of the voter. This data is then used to 
create the cryptographic hash and contributes towards creating the transaction ID. The verification of such 
credentials is envisioned to be achieved at User Interaction and Front-end Security layer (layer 1). A 
number of virtual instances of nodes are involved in the process of mining to get this transaction finally 
enter into the chain. 
Ledger Synchronization layer synchronizes Multichain ledger with the local application specific database 
using one of the existing database technologies. Votes cast are recorded in the data tables at the backend 
of the database. Voters are able to track their votes using the unique identifier provided to them as soon as 
their vote is mined and added into the blockchain ledger. The security considerations of the votes are 
based on block-chain technology using cryptographic hashes to secure end-to-end communication. Voting 
results are also stored in the application’s database with the view to facilitate auditing and any further 
operations at a later stage. 
 
The Voting Process 
We now describe a typical interaction of a user with the proposed scheme based on our current 
implementation of the system. Typically, a voter logs into the system by providing his/her thumb 
impression. If the match is found, the voter is then presented with a list of available candidates with the 
option to cast vote against them. On the contrary, if the match is unsuccessful, any further access would 
be denied. This function is achieved using appropriate implementation of the authentication mechanism 
(fingerprinting in this case) and predefined role based access control management. Furthermore, it is also 
envisioned that a voter is assigned to their specific constituency and this information is used to develop 
the list of candidates that a voter can vote for. The assignment of voter to a constituency is rendered an 
offline process and therefore out of scope of this research. 
After a successful vote-cast, it is mined by multiple miners for validation following which valid and 
verified votes are added into public ledger. The security considerations of the votes are based on 
blockchain technology using cryptographic hashes to secure end-to-end verification. To this end, a 
successful vote cast is considered as a transaction within the blockchain of the voting application. 
Therefore, a vote cast is added as a new block (after successful mining) in the blockchain as well as being 
recorded in data tables at the backend of the database. The system ensures only one-person, one-vote 
(democracy) property of voting systems. This is achieved by using the voter’s unique thumbprint, which 
is matched at the beginning of every voting attempt to prevent double voting. A transaction is generated 
as soon as the vote is mined by the miners which is unique for each vote. If the vote is found malicious it 
is rejected by miners.  
After validation process, a notification is immediately sent to the voter through message or an email 
providing the above defined transaction id by which user can track his/her vote into the ledger. Although 
this functions as a notification to the voter however it does not enable any user to extract the information 
about how a specific voter voted thereby achieving privacy of a voter. It is important here to note that 
cryptographic hash for a voter is the unique hash of voter by which voter is known in the blockchain. This 
property facilitates achieving verifiability of the overall voting process. Furthermore, this id is hidden and 
no one can view it even a system operator cannot view this hash therefore achieving privacy of individual 
voters. 
 
Fig. 2  Asset creation using Multichain 
 
IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION 
Implementation 
The implementation of the proposed system has been carried out within a controlled environment with a 
web-based application created to serve as the front end application enabling the users to interact in a 
convenient manner. This application is implemented via Java EE within the Netbeans platform with 
native Glassfish server used for hosting the application. Glassfish managed server side container for 
holding the application’s EJBs and the data source. The application uses a MySQL as the backend 
database for the application and contains the data entered manually by an admin such as the voter details, 
constituency details and the information about different political parties running for the election. An 
application screenshot demonstrating the admin function to view list of eligible voters is presented in Fig. 
2. In addition to manual entries, the application also supports importing data using MS Excel spread 
sheets to perform bulk import in view of the size of the data in real-world voting scenarios. We have used 
Multichain as the blockchain platform to create a private blockchain for this application which is used for 
recording the voting transactions. This choice is influenced by the ease of use provided by this platform 
and therefore it was easily integrated into our proposed architecture. 
 
Evaluation and Experimentation  
The primary objective of evaluation was to assess the performance of the system in view of the e-voting 
system requirements presented in section 2 and to identify any considerations with regards to its 
application in a real world scenario. The experimentation consisted of multiple steps i.e. conducting 
multiple transactions, verification of transactions, mining transactions into blockchain, reflection of the 
changes made in the public ledger to all the nodes in the network and the usability of the system. 
A test run was made directly at Multichain by starting from asset creation. An outcome of this is 
demonstrated by Fig. 3. We can refer these assets as votes. Since Multichain by default ideally suits to 
cryptocurrency, therefore we wrote our API’s to design it in the context of vote. In order to perform 
transaction in Multichain, we identified the address and the balance in the address of the node of 
Multichain from where the asset (vote) will be sent. 
While sending the asset to the address, the transaction hash was generated carrying the transfer of vote. 
The balance of the receiving node was incremented by one vote (asset). The transaction becomes a part of 
the public ledger which shows that it has been mined. A sample transaction within the proposed system is 
presented by Fig. 3. Since our customized API for asset creation is designed in such a way that an address 
can have at max only one vote (asset), therefore, it will not be possible for a voter to caste multiple vote  
unless the node receives it from some other address which is only allowed in the case of the candidate. 
 
Fig. 3  A sample transaction information for the proposed system 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Electronic voting has been used in varying forms since 1970s with fundamental benefits over paper based 
systems such as increased efficiency and reduced errors. With the extraordinary growth in the use of 
blockchain technologies, a number of initiatives have been made to explore the feasibility of using 
blockchain to aid an effective solution to e-voting. This paper has presented one such effort which 
leverages benefits of blockchain such as cryptographic foundations and transparency to achieve an 
effective solution to e-voting. The proposed approach has been implemented with Multichain and in-
depth evaluation of approach highlights its effectiveness with respect to achieving fundamental 
requirements for an e-voting scheme.  
In continuation of this work, we are focused at improving the resistance of blockchain technology to 
‘double spending’ problem which will translate as ‘double voting’ for e-voting systems. Although 
blockchain technology achieves significant success in detection of malleable change in a transaction 
however successful demonstration of such events have been achieve which motivates us to investigate it 
further. To this end, we believe an effective model to establish trustworthy provenance for e-voting 
systems will be crucial to achieve an end-to-end verifiable e-voting scheme. The work to achieve this is 
underway in the form of an additional provenance layer to aid the existing blockchain based 
infrastructure. 
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